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A CRITIQUE OF SOURCE CONFIDENTIALITY
EDWARD WASSERMAN*

INTRODUCTION

The exposure of CIA agent Valerie Plame by columnist Robert Novak has touched off a wave of media self-examination
about the venerable practice of promising to withhold the names
of news sources who insist on anonymity. The practice has
become so routine' that it goes practically unnoticed even by
sophisticated readers, who have grown used to assertions from
"administration officials," "a Western diplomat in Baghdad,"
"financial experts," "weapons scientists," and the growing range
of locutions used to authenticate informants and present their
views without saying who they are, let alone what their agendas
might be. 2
The political atmospherics surrounding the Novak affair,
however, have ensured both notoriety and hand wringing. An
honored custom was apparently put to unsavory ends in a matter
of the highest public concern. Robert Novak is a widely circulated, generally conservative commentator who is seen, perhaps
unfairly, as an unswerving George W. Bush administration loyalist. His action in "outing" Valerie Plame-based on information
he attributed to two unnamed administration officials-was
widely denounced by administration foes as a harsh reprisal for
her husband's headline-grabbing claim that the President spoke
falsely in offering a key justification for invading Iraq. Hence
confidentiality, instead of shielding a whistleblower from punish*
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation Professor of Journalism Ethics, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va. Ph.D., London School of
Economics, 1980; Licence, University of Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), 1972;
B.A., Yale University, 1970.
1. Randy Dotinga, Unnamed Sources: Essential or Overused?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 12, 2004, at 3, available at www.csmonitor.com/2004/ 0812/
p03s01-usju.html (citing estimate that 40% of New York Times A-section stories in
December 2003 featured anonymous sources).
2. SUSAN D. MOELLER, CTR. FOR INT'L & SEC. STUD. MD., MEDIA COVERAGE
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 44-49 (2004), available at http://
www.cissm.umd.edu/documents/WMDstudyshort.pdf (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) (discussing ways in which public
understanding of the complexities of chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear
weapons was harmed by the ability of prominent officials to get extensive publicity for their views without being associated with them).
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ment, apparently facilitated that punishment.' As a result of an
ensuing investigation into the leak, reporters with a number of
national publications faced intense prosecutorial pressure to give
evidence about the sources they used for subsequent stories featuring the same disclosures about Plame.'
We will return in a moment to the details of this affair. My
purpose here, however, is not to adjudicate a political dispute; it
is to examine the ethics of the journalist's confidentiality pledge.
Instead of asserting, as some have, that its status as a promise
trumps competing ethical claims, I want to consider how to
determine when the confidentiality promise is indeed ethically
robust-and when it should yield to other ethical
considerations.'
As a preliminary note, I should point out that although they
may appear in discussions of this affair to be conjoined twins,
confidentiality and promise-keeping are actually two very different things in the journalist's moral universe. Keeping a source
secret need not involve a promise; promises may not entail
secrecy. A journalist might, for instance, decide to conceal reliance on a document to avoid tipping off a competitor, to keep
other potential informants from knowing how much the reporter
already knows, or because possession of the document is illegal.
We could evaluate that non-disclosure solely in terms of ethical
3. See Editorial,
Journalists FaceJail Time, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 11, 2004, at A18;
Geneva Overholser, The Journalistand the Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004,
at A27.
4. For a useful account of prosecutorial maneuverings, see Eric Boehlert,
Risky Business, SALON, Aug. 13, 2004, at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/
2004/08/13/plame_leaks/index.hml (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy). See also Carol D. Leonnig,Journalist Testifies in CIA
Case, WASH. PosT, Aug. 25, 2004, at A2. A curious compromise appears to have
been devised, under which reporters who had interviewed I. Lewis "Scooter"
Libby, Chief of Staff for Vice President Dick Cheney and apparently a suspect in
the case, submitted to interviews, with his approval, in which they cleared him
of blame. The notion that reporters would feel free to talk about who was not
their confidential source is troubling, since that investigative technique plainly
seems intended to close the circle ever tighter and eventually leave the real
informants exposed.
5. The supremacy of the promise is argued by David Shaw, media writer
for the Los Angeles Times "Once granted, that promise can't be withdrawn without significant and long-lasting consequences. A promise is a contract-not in
a legal sense but in both a moral and a practical sense." David Shaw, Promises of
Confidentiality Aren't Made To Be Broken, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at E16. Lucy
Dalglish of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press notes, "Reporters can't maintain their credibility unless they keep their promises to sources."
Eric Boehlert, Bad News, SALON, Jan. 22, 2004, at http://archive.salon.com/news/
feature/2004/O1/22/confidentiality/indexl. html (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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maxims such as truth-telling and ensuring accountability; neither
has much to do with keeping one's word.
Likewise, journalists make plenty of promises-to sources,
bosses, colleagues, competitors, even spouses-that bear on work
product but have nothing to do with confidentiality. The
reporter might promise a source to portray her in a certain light,
to spin the story this way rather than that, or to play up some
flattering detail. News organizations routinely embargo news
until an agreed-upon release time, reporters agree to stay with
the group during a press tour, and so forth. Any of those
promises might have an ethical dimension, yet none involves
secrecy.
Thus the confidentiality promise is a hybrid and requires
examination from a number of ethical perspectives: the obligation, if any, to protect sources; whether concealment conflicts
with other professional duties; the circumstances under which
secrecy ought to be compromised; and confidentiality as itself an
instrument of promise-breaking.
Ultimately, our discussion will suggest that the ethical stature of a confidentiality promise depends, first, on an informationalanalysis: Does the secrecy it ensures facilitate or impede the
journalist's core duty, which is to gather and make public important information? In that respect, source confidentiality is similar to a reporter's agreeing not to divulge certain awkward facts
an informant is providing solely because the source insists they
be withheld, even though they would otherwise be part of the
story. The question of whether doing so is appropriate can be
analyzed within the broad lines of a craft-based critique: Did the
agreement help, or hinder, the reporter in doing his or her job?
Did the arrangement, on balance, benefit the public by bringing
to light important governmental information? The specific question raised by the Novak-Plame affair is what to make of the
promise to conceal a source when the identity of the source rivals
in significance the information the source provided-and
indeed, if made public, would likely become the focus of the
affair.
On a second level, the judgment depends on a relational
analysis: Does the confidentiality agreement privilege the journalist-source relationship at the expense of the journalist's relationship to the public? Here we will evaluate the agreement by
whether it is consistent with the larger, contextual trust relationship between journalist and public. I will adapt the approach to
trust-defined as a relationship of generalized reliance involving
parties of unequal status and power-as developed by moral phi-
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losopher Annette Baier 6 and apply a variant of her expressibility
standard: The morality of the promise depends on whether disclosing the understandings, expectations, and motives for it
would undermine the trust on which the journalist-public relationship is built.
The expressibility standard offers the beginnings of an analysis of practical value to reporters and editors trying to decide
which confidentiality agreements are consistent with their obligation to their public: Would your readers understand and accept
the value and propriety of the arrangement if they knew why you
and your source were making it?
I.

THE WILSON-PLAME AFFAIR

A retired career diplomat named Joseph C. Wilson IV was
sent to Niger by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in February
2002 to investigate a report attributed to Italian intelligence that
Saddam Hussein's regime had been trying to buy yellowcake uranium for weapons. Wilson reported back that he found no evidence of such an effort.7
Nevertheless, President Bush in his State of the Union
Address in January 2003 spoke of Iraqi attempts to buy uranium
in West Africa as evidence of Saddam's hunger for strategic weapons, a principal justification for the pre-emptive war that followed in March.8 Several months after Mr. Bush's speech,
Wilson wrote an opinion piece in the New York Times wondering
aloud why the administration had advanced claims that he, as its
designated investigator, had determined were baseless. 9
Wilson's July 6th op-ed column was published at a time of
growing disquiet within the United States over the postwar failure of U.S. and British forces to discover the weapons of mass
destruction that had been identified as a major threat to regional
and world peace and brandished as a casus belli. His statement6.

ANNETTE BALER, MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 120-25 (1994)

(discussing the expressibility test).
7. For a useful chronology of Wilson's inquiries, see James Risen, How
Niger Uranium Story Defied Wide Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at A14.
8. Id. President Bush credited the information to British intelligence:
"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." Wilson said he had learned that
the Iraqis had put out feelers in 1999 about establishing expanded commercial
relations with Niger. Those had been interpreted as potentially involving uranium, but Niger had never responded, perhaps because its uranium industry is
under the control of a French consortium. Id.
9. Joseph C. Wilson IV, What I Didn't Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2003, at WK9.
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"I have little choice but to conclude that some intelligence
related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat"'°-fed widening doubts about the administration's claims.
On July 14, Chicago Sun-Times columnist Robert Novak, one
of the country's best-read pro-administration commentators,
wrote a syndicated column in which he reported, apparently in
an attempt to cast doubt on Wilson's bona fides, that the former
ambassador got the assignment to Niger thanks to the intervention of his wife, Valerie Plame. Novak described her as "an
Agency operative on weapons of mass destruction."" In fact, she
was a fully-trained, veteran intelligence agent with extensive
experience in foreign postings under diplomatic cover. In short,
she was a U.S. spy. 2
In the aftermath of Novak's column, Wilson charged, as did
other administration critics, that Plame's cover was deliberately
blown in an effort to discredit her husband's uranium allegations
and to depict him as the undeserving and under-qualified benefi13
This suggests that
ciary of her backroom influence-peddling.
Plame was exposed as a political action calculated to dampen dissent within the government, that Novak was the instrument by
which that action was taken, and that his confidentiality pledge
was an element essential to the success of the action, since it enabled the question of calculated, high-level administration involvement to remain unanswered.
Depending on the circumstances, exposing an undercover
U.S. intelligence agent may be illegal under the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act of 1982,14 though there is real question
5
as to that law's applicability to this affair. Still, the origin of the
10.
11.

Id.
Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2003, at

31.
12. Vicky Ward, Double Exposure, VANTy FAIR, Jan. 2004, at 74.
13. Id.
14. 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2000).
15. For background on the law, see Jack Schafer, Free Matt Cooper!, SLATE,
Aug. 10, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2104982/ (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). See also the Wall StreetJournal's
polemic in The Novak Exception-l, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at A16 (citing
opinion that law was not intended to muzzle reporters).
Victoria Toensing, who helped draft the bill as chief counsel to the
Senate Intelligence Committee, says its narrow language is no coincidence. "The language was specifically designed to distinguish between
exposures that came in the course of legitimate journalism and those
intending to subvert our intelligence services," she says. "And it was
shaped by concerns we heard expressed at the time by the leading
newspapers."
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leak became the subject of investigation by a special prosecutor
appointed by Attorney General John Ashcroft. By late summer
2004 the prosecutor was calling witnesses before a grand jury in
Washington, D.C. Several prominent members of the Washington press corps were subpoenaed, purportedly because Novak
was not the only journalist to whom Plame's job as a spy was
disclosed. 16
II.

FACTUAL DISPUTES

Some significant facts about the Plame outing are in dispute.
First, the circumstances under which Novak learned about her
undercoverjob are unclear. He never really says how he came by
the information. In his original column Novak simply asserts
that she is a CIA "operative" and offers no attribution. In a follow-up column in October 2003 addressing the controversy his
first column triggered,'" he writes that a "senior administration
official" had told him that "Wilson had been sent by the CIA's
counterproliferation section at the suggestion of one of its
employees, his wife." Novak adds that a second official, also
unnamed, subsequently agreed that Plame had a role in getting
Wilson the assignment.
Hence, there is no clarity as to whether Novak discovered
the information about Plame himself, or was instead sought out
as a sympathetic conduit for a leak the administration wanted to
make, confident that its messengers would be protected by an
anonymity pledge. I"
Id.
16. SeeMatthew Cooper etal., A War on Wilson?, TIMEJuly 17, 2003, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/aricle/0,8599,465270,O0.html (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). The Time
article, by implication, ranges Novak among the weapons the administration
deployed in trying to counter Wilson's charges.
It is notable that other news organizations have not tried aggressively to
identify the source of the Plame disclosure, even though doing so might implicate high-ranking administration officials in illegal conduct and, in that regard,
would be a sensational and important story. The restraint implies that in practice, entities that are not parties to a confidentiality agreement may nevertheless
feel honor bound to respect it by proxy, as a deformed kind of professional
courtesy. That is a disturbing aspect to this affair-one that lies outside the
bounds of this Essay. Such deference, in my view, is bereft of moral logic and
seems to have more to do with a misplaced, clubby collegiality than with professional ethics.
17. Robert Novak, Columnist Wasn't Pawnfor Leak, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 1,
2003, at 49.
18. See Ward, supra note 12. In one account, Novak said that his administration sources had sought him out, and in another he insisted they had not.
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It has been reported that the allegation that Plame pushed
to get her husband the job had been offered to a half-dozen
Washington journalists-who declined to publish it-before
Novak agreed to run it.19 Novak explicitly denied that contention in his follow-up column, and subsequent reporting suggests
that administration operatives did aggressively shop the story, but
only after Novak reported it, because they wanted to ensure the
2°
If so, that would alter
Plame connection got wide attention.
the character of the intrigue: Instead of an orchestrated intimidation campaign we would have a post facto effort to get mileage
from a fortuitous indiscretion. So the jury, grand and otherwise,
is out."
Second, Novak's statements suggest he might not have fully
realized Plame was a spy and that her job was truly covert. He
admits a CIA spokesman who was assigned to talk to him before
the first column ran had implored him not to identify Plame.
"He asked me not to use her name," Novak wrote, "saying she
probably never again will be given a foreign assignment but that
exposure of her name might cause 'difficulties' if she travels
abroad. ' 22 But according to Novak, because the spokesman did
might be put at risk, he ignored
not specifically say Plame's life 23
the request and identified her.
Third, the question of whether Plame actually did play some
role in her husband's selection is controversial. The CIA spokesman had flatly denied that she had anything to do with the
19. See, e.g, Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Bush Administration Is Focus of
Inquiy: CIA Agent's Identity Was Leaked to Media, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2003, at
Al.
Yesterday, a senior administration official said that before Novak's column ran, two top White House officials called at least six Washington
journalists and disclosed the identity and occupation of Wilson's
wife . . . . 'Clearly, it was meant purely and simply for revenge,' the
A source said reporters
senior official said of the alleged leak ....

quoted a leaker as describing Wilson's wife as 'fair game.'
Id.
NEws20. Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Criminal orJust Plain Stupid?,
20
WEEK, Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/31582 / (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). Newsweek determined that the calls to the half-dozen journalists came after Novak's column
had appeared. That is also when MSNBC talk show host Chris Matthews allegedly told Wilson that Bush chief of staff "Karl Rove . . . said your wife was fair
game." Id.
21. For a discussion about the discrepancies between the Newsweek and
Post accounts, see Murray Waas, PluggingLeaks, AM. PROSPECT ONLINE, Mar. 8,

2004, at http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2004/03/waas-m-O-0
(on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
22. Novak, supra note 17.
23. Id.

8

.html
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appointment, a response Novak left out of his first column. That
was a disturbing omission, since the hint of nepotism was Novak's
only valid reason for identifying her at all, and the agency denial
was categorical. A Senate Intelligence Committee report subsequently offered some support for the notion that Plame helped
Wilson get the assignment-which was unpaid-inasmuch as the
committee found she had indeed written a memo to superiors
extolling his qualifications.2 4 Novak's position was that because
Wilson had served under President Clinton and had recently
indicated his support for the presidential candidacy of Democratic Senator John Kerry, selecting him to go to Niger was "an
otherwise incredible choice," if not for his wife's influence.25
Attempting to resolve these factual disputes is beyond the
scope of this discussion. What is noteworthy is that much of the
commentary on the ethics of Novak's confidentiality agreement
assumes facts strongly unfavorable to him-and then asserts that
they do not matter and the ethical status of his confidentiality
pledge is unimpaired. Hence, even if Plame was indeed outed as
part of a calculated, political smear; even if Novak knew that she
was an undercover agent and that publishing her name was illegal; indeed, even if the assertion that she helped get her husband
the Niger assignment was false and the leaker who said as much
was lying; the sanctity of Novak's promise still obliges him to pro26
tect his informant.

24. Mary Jacoby, Joseph Wilson vs. the Right-Wing Conspiracy,SALON,July 16,
2004, at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/O7/16/wilson/index_
np.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy)
(offering a useful summary of the Senate Intelligence Committee findings concerning whether Plame nominated her husband for the assignment, and Wilson's response to those). The internal memo from Plame to her superiors
stated, in part: "[M]y husband has good relations with both the [Nigerien] PM
(prime minister) and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of
French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity." Id. Wilson, a former ambassador to Gabon, had been honored by President George H.W. Bush for his service as the number two U.S. official at the
Baghdad embassy on the eve of the first Gulf War. Id.
25. Novak, supra note 17.
26. See, e.g., Boehlert, supra note 5. Referring to the Novak case and that
of Wen Ho Lee, the former weapons scientist who is suing the government for
defaming him through confidential leaks, Aly Colon, ethics group leader at the
Poynter Institute, the highly regarded journalism training center in St. Petersburg, Florida, said that together these cases create "one of those situations
where people are holding their noses because the stench is so bad ....But the
consequences of not defending the principle that you've made a promise is
even worse. Because if you don't defend the ones that stink, how do you
defend that ones that don't?" Id.
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As we will argue, the notion that the ethics of a confidentiality agreement can be evaluated without considering what information it secured, why the information was sought or proffered,
and whether it was even true is untenable. Promise-keeping
deserves an honored place in any hierarchy of journalistic maxims, but close analysis suggests that it must bow to other considerations if the journalist's defining duty-to maintain the trust with
the public that derives from honestly gathering and delivering
information that, in his or her judgment, a self-governing polity
must know-is to prevail.
In the following section, I will discuss the ethics of the confidentiality promise from several perspectives. Then I will return
to the Novak-Plame case and offer some conclusions.
III.
PROTECTING

CONFIDENTIALITY SCRUTINIZED

SOURCES: Source confidentiality's most obvious

function is to shield informants from potential harm. "Source
protection" has an ethical ring to it, but journalists do not, by
and large, recognize any generalized obligation to look out for
the well-being of their sources. I think the silence of journalism
ethics in this regard is regrettable. After all, many people who
come forward with information are apprehensive, naive, and ripe
for exploitation. Unsophisticated sources may unwittingly say
things that expose them to ridicule, trusting the amiable and
knowledgeable reporter who is encouraging their candor to warn
7
them when they cross the line. Too, a source may be vulnerain ways similar to some
develop
ble, and the relationship may
with the informant
relationships,
doctor-patient
and
lawyer-client
from the
approaches
extra-curricular
improper,
to
susceptible
28
reporter.
For an exception that is thoughtful and provocative, see generally
Malcolm is especially eloquent on the notion that some measure of deceit is involved in even
routine reporter-source relations. True, articulating a standard of care owed to
informants would be difficult. Even a seasoned journalist cannot know in
advance what harm-or benefit, for that matter-might befall a source. A formulaic "warning label" to sources, telling them that their lives might change
fundamentally or not at all, would have little practical value. Moreover, the
journalist's job is to get information, not perform counseling work with conflicted informants. Still, it does seem that the problem at least of naive sources
is worth addressing, and it should be possible to formulate some reasonable
procedures, based perhaps on a distinction analogous to the public vs. private
figure distinction central to contemporary libel law.
28. The Bob Greene affair is on point. Greene was a widely syndicated
columnist with the Chicago Tribune who was fired in 2002 when it was revealed
that he had had a sexual encounter with a woman who was a subject of his
27.

JANET MALCOLM, THE JOURNALIST AND THE MURDERER (1990).
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Nevertheless, the boundary of journalistic solicitude for the
well-being of sources is defined by the reporter's desire to preserve the conditions under which accurate information can be
gathered. It follows that a reporter is more protective of an
informant's interests if the source seems likely to be useful in the
future. That implies greater consideration for officials and other
consistently valuable informants. Sources are awarded protection based not on their needs, but on their abilities.
CONFIDENTIALITY AS SOURCE PROTECTION: It follows that
although confidentiality may protect a source, journalists accept
no freestanding obligation to withhold an informant's identity
even if they believed-or would believe, if they gave it any
thought-that secrecy would be in the source's best interests. A
reporter would not, for example, urge a source to demand concealment if the reporter understood-and the source did notthat exposure could be perilous. Confidentiality is nothing more
than a valuable information-gathering technique; its claim to ethical standing derives solely from the enhanced information its
judicious use brings to the public. It does not reflect an obligation owed to the source, unless the source insists on it as a condition of providing that information. In that regard it is a
technique of source self-defense, which the reporter accedes to
and does not proffer.2 9
If instead the journalist did recognize an independent ethical duty to the informant to withhold the source's name if disclosure might be harmful, the source would not need to demand
anonymity. That is not the case. In fact, journalists are typically
admonished to grant confidentiality only if necessary.3" Conficolumn a decade before, when she was a high school student in her late teens.
Although the sexual liaison began only after he had written about the young
woman, his conduct was condemned as a betrayal of trust. Precisely whose trust
Greene betrayed is not clear-it is hard to argue, for instance, that the public
was harmed-but some impropriety may arise from the vulnerability of an unsophisticated source to the predations of a celebrity journalist. For an account of
the affair, see Jim Kirk & Monica Davey, Breach of Trust Ends Greene's Career at
Tribune, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 2002, §1, at 1.
29. One might try to ground a source-protection ethic in the maxim that
journalists should seek to "minimize harm" occasioned by their own efforts. See
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNAUsTs, CODE OF ETHics (1996), available at
http://www.spj.org/ethics-code.asp (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
30. The New York Times' code, for instance, states:
In routine interviewing-that is, most of the interviewing we do-anonymity must not be automatic or an assumed condition. In that kind
of reporting, anonymity should not be offered to a source. Exceptions
will occur in the reporting of highly sensitive stories, when it is we who
have sought out a source who may face legal jeopardy or loss of liveli-
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dentiality is part of a negotiation over the release of information
and owes its ethical standing to the quality of the information it
makes public-and to its being secured by a promise. In a
moment we will look at the curious ethical status of that promise.
CONFIDENTIALITY

AS

INCONSISTENT

WITH

OTHER

OBLIGA-

Certain kinds of reporting routinely incorporate routine
reliance on informants who will not talk unless they are assured
of anonymity.3 1 Although sensitive political and governmental
stories are the areas that first come to mind, business and financial news-especially coverage of closely-held companies, professional firms and the like-would be difficult if not impossible to
assemble without source concealment. Yet confidentiality poses
ethical conflicts, chiefly because it may clash with two professional norms: accountability and verifiability. 2 The result may
impede truth-telling.
Accountability involves an obligation to ensure that the
ledger of significant actions and assertions be reported publicly
in such a way that their authors are linked to them. Confidentiality enhances accountability when it helps expose subterranean
agreements, decisions, and actions that would otherwise go unreported. But secrecy may also hinder accountability by interposing the journalist between informant and public, and preventing
third-parties from challenging sources over inaccuracies, indiscretions, or lies. It may also scrub the record clean of grudges
and personal agendas that have bearing on the information, and
thereby prevent dishonest or tainted informants from being
exposed as such.
Verifiability, which is the closest journalism comes to offering a functional equivalent to the standards of social science, usually is premised on associating information with the person who
provides it. That enables third-parties to determine that the

TIONS:

hood for speaking with us. Similarly they will occur in approaches to
authoritative officials in government who, as a matter of policy, do not
speak for attribution.
The N.Y. Times Company, Confidential News Sources (Feb. 25, 2004), at http://
www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-sources.html (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
31. For a strong defense of the use of confidential sources offered by an
unusually accomplished investigative reporter, see Affidavit of Scott Armstrong,
Lee v. United States Dep't of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2003) (No.
99-3380(TPJ)).
32. A contrary position was advanced in a Los Angeles Times editorial:
"Leaks are not only the vital fuel of investigative journalism, they are an essential mechanism for holding powerful institutions accountable." All Leaks Are Not
Alike, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at B12.
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words were spoken, just as reported, by the person who was said
to have uttered them.
Here again, confidentiality may impair accuracy. It can
impede testing the truthfulness of information; nobody else can
phone the reporter's secret source to confirm, refute, or modify
the original information. Anonymity, USA Today founder Al
Neuharth observed, enables sources to say more than they know
and reporters to write more than they hear.33
THE ETHICS OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROMISE: It is understandable that press commentators should be adamant about the
importance of journalists' honoring their word. After all, promise-keeping is a square-sounding maxim that seems to go to the
white-hot core of truth-telling that is journalism's noblest mission-and to the credibility that is its greatest contemporary
challenge.
Still, the morality of keeping a promise is logically dependent on the morality of the conduct that the promise is meant to
secure. It would be hard to defend a promise to commit murder
as an ethical one unless the murder itself was warranted. The
morality of that promise could not rest solely on the notion that
failing to honor it might cause others to doubt one's resolve to
keep non-homicidal commitments.
Imagining confidentiality agreements that a journalist ought
to break is not hard. Suppose exposing an informant would save
a life, prevent a serious crime, or free an innocent prisoner. The
argument for guarding those secrets seems grounded largely in
concern for the reputational harm the journalist might sustain by
burning the source, and whether that might cripple his or her
future effectiveness. That is not chiefly an ethical calculation,
however; it is an operational one.3 4 There is, in short, nothing
about promise-keeping in itself that privileges it above such maxims as telling the truth, avoiding unnecessary harm, respecting
privacy, and other imperatives that journalists embrace as profes33. Neuharth's full quote is: "Anonymous sources ... inevitably lead to
lies. Here's why: The anonymous source, ifin fact one exists, generally is a
coward who tells more than he or she knows. The reporter permitted to use
such sources often writes more than he or she hears." Al Neuharth, How to
Detect Lies in Your Newspaper, USA TODAY, May 23, 2003, at 15A.
34. True, one could argue that there is an ethical dimension to the consequences of ajournalist's behaving in untrustworthy ways. If the behavior brings
discredit to the profession and makes journalism's social mission harder to fulfill, that is no mere operational problem; it has caused an impairment that has
moral consequence. Still, building an ethical argument on speculation about
how the public might perceive a particular action seems too unsteady to be
useful. The spectacle of a reporter whose confidentiality promise shields
wrongdoing might just as easily deepen public disdain for the profession.
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sional norms. Breaking a promise might simply make it difficult
for the journalist to continue practicing a certain kind of
journalism.
What if the source is breaking the law? Is the confidentiality
promise still binding? There is a tradition ofjudicial reluctance,
under certain circumstances, to enforce contracts that are contrary to law or public policy.3 5 It might be argued that the
alleged illegality of the Plame disclosure thus trumps any other
question about its ethical status.3 6 Under that logic Novak
should not have made the agreement because he thereby colluded in-indeed, was the instrument of-an illegal act. While
that might be valid as a matter of law, it is not helpful as a question of ethics which, in part, is in the business of sorting out what
the law should be.3 7 This reasoning also would have barred Neil
Sheehan of the New York Times from helping Daniel Ellsberg
release the in-house history of the Vietnam War known as the
Pentagon Papers in 1971.38 It would leave us unable to distinguish genuinely toxic disclosures from unauthorized releases of
vital information that expose important governmental wrongdoing, and which violate only ill-founded secrecy laws intended to
save officials from embarrassment. Plus, as a practical matter,
basing moral judgments on apparent legalities would reduce ethics to speculating about how judges, juries, and appeals courts
may eventually rule. In this case, as noted, outing Valerie Plame
may not have broken any law, in that her exposure was not
intended to subvert U.S. intelligence operations but to illuminate
the reasons behind an act of non-classified, public agency decision-making.
CONFIDENTIALITY AS A TOOL OF PROMISE-BREAKING: The paradox of the journalist's confidentiality agreement is that it often
represents not only a promise, but a critique of promise-keeping.
That is because it is frequently a device to provide cover for informants so they can break prior agreements of their own with
35. "The power to contract is not unlimited. While as a general rule
there is the utmost freedom of action in this regard, some restrictions are
placed upon the right by legislation, by public policy, and by the nature of
things. Parties cannot make a binding contract in violation of law or of public
policy." Sternamen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763 (N.Y. 1902), quoted
in 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.01 (3d ed. 2004).
36.

See, e.g., Moeller, supra note 2.

37. My colleague Louis Hodges, Knight Professor of Journalism Ethics
Emeritus at Washington and Lee University, made this point in discussion during the 37th Institute on Ethics in Journalism on March 27, 2004.
38. For an account of Ellsberg's dealings with the New York Times, see
DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS
ch. 26 (2002).

566

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19

impunity. Its claim to superior ethical standing rests on a presumption that all promises do not have equivalent moral weight.
Why do reporters promise confidentiality? Informants may
sometimes insist on anonymity simply to avoid the awkwardness
that may come with notoriety. They may have personal reasons
to keep out of the news. They may not want to spend time fending off other reporters once they are named publicly. Perhaps
they are settling scores and do not want their targets to know the
origin of the attack. Sometimes they are sharing painful and intimate experiences-sickness, poverty, the death of loved onesand would not do so if they were to be identified.
But often, especially when the stories involve insider news
from powerful institutions, sources insist on confidentiality
because they are betraying prior commitments by giving away
information that they have agreed, sometimes explicitly, to keep
private. The journalist's secrecy pledge is, in this respect, an
offer to shelter the informant from the consequences of
dishonoring agreements of his or her own. It is a promise meant
to induce promise-breaking.
So, implicit in the confidentiality agreement is the insight
that not all promises are equal. The conscience-stricken executive decides that his or her duties to the corporation, which certainly involve discretion and may also oblige silence, are less
important than disclosing accounting chicanery or environmental felonies. The whistle-blower demands one promise from the
reporter to enable him or her to break another to the corporation. The ethics of that exchange have much to do with the
weight attached to such maxims as truth-telling and affirming
community norms, as compared with employee loyalty and, yes,
promise-keeping.
CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGES SOURCE RELATIONS:

Source

con-

fidentiality necessarily privileges the relationship of reporter to
informant over the relationship of reporter to public. That is not
only because reporter and source agree-conspire, really-to
keep to themselves, for reasons internal to their transaction,
information that would normally be made public. It is also
because the journalist-instead of presenting supporting information to authenticate a report and maintaining the usual professional stance as skeptical interlocutor-lines up alongside the
unnamed source in asserting the information's truthfulness,
while denying the public any independent way to evaluate
whether that truth claim is valid. The reporter invests reputation
in the information; correcting it if it proves inaccurate becomes
especially awkward, since that correction involves repudiating a
source who has never been identified and may require the jour-
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nalist to admit to having been taken.3 9 That makes fixing mistakes harder, which impedes truth-telling.
Still, those risks may be worthwhile if the pledge creates a
protected refuge for individuals who otherwise would not come
forward with sensitive and publicly important information. The
test, when confidentiality is analyzed by which relations it privileges, is whether the flow of significant news is facilitated. Is the
journalist empowered or neutered? Is the main beneficiary the
public-in which case the reporter is functioning as its goodfaith proxy-or the shielded source? These are qualitative assessments, which require looking at the information sought,
obtained, and withheld. As noted earlier, confidentiality means
some information is kept back so that other information can be
published. The rightness of the arrangement cannot be
appraised withoutjudging whether the bargain between concealment and publication has been struck so as to benefit public
enlightenment-rather than, say, easing access to news outlets
for powerful insiders who have intrigues to pursue, or burnishing
the credential of a particular reporter as a trustworthy courtier in
the demimonde of palace politics.
CONFIDENTIALITY AND TRUST: Finally, I suggested earlier that
confidentiality can be examined in terms borrowed from Annette
Baier's thoughtful analysis of trust relationships. The relationship between journalist and public seems to comport more satisfactorily with Baier's description of trust than with a more
contractarian model. That is, the relationship is one of a generalized reliance that is not formal or explicit and is not specific as
to what particular behavior it covers; nor is it between parties of
roughly equivalent power. Here it is built on the public's expectation that journalists will use their best judgment to gather and
present an honest rendering of information that they believe the
public needs to have.
Baier suggests that the morality of a trust relationship can be
assessed by applying what she terms the expressibility test: Would
the relationship withstand having its foundations laid bare? The
hard-charging executive who trusts her chief aide without reservation because she secretly believes the assistant is too
unimaginative to pose a threat-that is not a morally robust trust
relationship and would crumble if its premises were articulated.
39. See The Times and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al0. The New York
Times' recent mea culpa regarding its flawed prewar coverage of Iraq's weapons
programs is an unusual and praiseworthy example of a news organization owning up to the difficulty of both reporting and evaluating the information
offered by sources it agreed to keep secret.
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Similarly, Baier's expressibility test is a promising way to
examine a confidentiality agreement. A source who bases his
reliance on the courage and honesty of a reporter enters into a
morally different relationship than does one who relies on an
avowedly partisan journalist's gullibility and blind loyalty. Suppose you, the reporter, are agreeing to withhold the name of the
politician who is giving you a self-serving leak because you wish to
endear yourself to the office-holder and get preferential access to
information in the future. Is that something you would be comfortable disclosing to your readers, or would it undermine the
trust they confer on you?
Naturally, applying this test raises problems. After the fact,
either party to the agreement can buff his or her view of the relationship to make it morally pristine. Just as Kant could not prescribe precisely how the maxim underlying a given action might
be framed as a universalized imperative,4" so this formulation is
slippery and subject to abuse. But expressibility offers a place to
stand in examining the ethics of confidentiality arrangements,
and post-facto explanations can be scrutinized for their plausibility and reasonableness.
IV.

NOVAK-PLAME

RECONSIDERED

The implication of the preceding is not that confidentiality
promises should be broken readily, but that they are powerful
and morally complex matters and should not be made lightly.4 ' I
have not focused on whether Robert Novak ought to reveal who
told him Valerie Plame was a spy. Still, in the absence of anything approaching an overriding public benefit to be served by
disclosure, I think the answer is no. Clearly, the argument for
breaking this promise fails the most dramatic tests of public benefit; it would not, for example, enable police to disarm a timebomb, unmask a dangerous criminal in high places, or avert
40. IMMANUEL KANT, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in
BAsic WRITINGS OF KANT 180-82 (Allen W. Wood ed., 2001). Cf JOHN STUART
MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS

ERNMENT 4 (Geraint Williams ed., 1993).

ON REPRESENTATIVE

Gov-

Mill writes of Kant: " When he begins
to deduce from this precept [the categorical imperative] any of the actual
duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any
contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by
all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct." Id.
41. All Leaks Are Not Alike, supra note 32, at B12. As the Los Angeles Times
editorialized: "Journalists . . . could help by being less promiscuous with offers
of anonymity in the first place. If it is information you believe should not be
out there-because it endangers lives (of a covert agent's contacts, for
instance) or because it is wrong or deeply misleading-why should you even
consider going to jail to protect the source?" Id.
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other serious harm. Nor would it undo damage already done to
a covert operative. True, disclosure would short-circuit a costly
federal investigation into the source of the leak and make it
more likely that the people responsible for it were taken to task.
But it is difficult to see those gains as substantially more than
conveniences, insufficient to justify Novak's declaring his promise void, even if he were prepared for the professional harm that
doing so might cause an inside-the-Beltway columnist who routinely traffics in whisperings.
But how ethical was the agreement in the first place? Let me
stipulate that this is an accurate description of the essentials of
the affair:
That certain high-level administration officials, embarrassed by Joseph Wilson's column repudiating the President's claims, sought to quell further dissent from the
intelligence community, which was eager to distance itself
from false claims about Iraqi weapons programs;
That they specifically wanted to punish Wilson both by
characterizing him as a superannuated beneficiary of nepotism and by thwarting his wife's career as an intelligence
operative;
That Novak understood these motives, and was glad to
help discredit Wilson;
That his determination to protect his sources reflected, in
part, a wish to cushion the administration from political
repercussions for moving against a disaffected, but truthful, whistle-blower.
Hence, Novak, as his fiercest critics allege, entered into a
confidentiality agreement with the specific intent of helping out
his administration friends by attacking a critic they wanted
attacked. Note that is an altogether different situation from one
where his intent was to enlighten his readers about how a wellconnected but unqualified bureaucrat, who was predisposed to
harm the administration, got a key assignment due to improper
influence.
The latter is not the story Novak wrote. He did not lay bare
the supposedly corrupt mechanics of Wilson's selection, and,
deplorably, he did not even mention the straight-up denialwhich the CIA gave him before he wrote his first column-of the
anonymous claim that Wilson's wife influenced the process. Had
he fully reported that story and found out whether indeed the
country's chief intelligence agency set out to discredit the President, he might have produced a valuable account of dissent, disenchantment, double-dealing, and perhaps nepotism. But he
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did not. The fatal flaw in Novak's work is not that he was overzealous, but that he was lazy. And the ready availability of confidential insider sources who stand ready to reward compliant
members of the press with self-interested leaks helps to perpetuate just that style of journalistic indolence.
The Novak-Plame affair is remarkable for the way it
telescopes so much that is ethically dubious about confidential
source-driven journalism into a single case. Such journalism
thrives on and in turn nourishes tight bonding between journalist and informant, rewards the reporter who writes principally for
his or her sources, and converts the reporter from skeptic to partisan. It makes journalists guarantors of secrecy rather than independent tribunes of accountability, leaves accuracy suspect, and
renders independent verification difficult. It frustrates efforts to
illuminate the ways that information is released or held back as
an instrumentality of power and how news is used to buttress or
undermine factions within officialdom.
Novak struck a deal in which he promised to withhold the
identity of government officials who were exposing a secret U.S.
agent-who herself had done no wrong and was not really the
subject of the column. In exchange, he received a modest, and
perhaps inaccurate, scoop about what was at worst a not terribly
important impropriety. The part of the story he withheld-his
sources-might have been hugely revealing of the character and
intensity of political brawling in Washington. In short, the story
that was not told was substantially more significant than the story
that was.
Moreover, Novak's agreement fares poorly when held to
Baier's expressibility standard. The evidence of nepotism was
slight, and making the case would require far stronger indications than he provided that Valerie Plame had the clout and
standing to actually influence her husband's selection. Plus, the
entire favoritism scenario, even if true, remains pointless, unless
one accepts the notion that senior American intelligence officers
essentially conspired to bury evidence of a grave strategic weapons threat by sending as their lead investigator on a critical mission a Foreign Service retainer who was ideologically predisposed
to ignore the truth. Quite a story. But none of that was even
hinted at in Novak's reporting, and it is indeed difficult to infer
any valid reportorial motive from the sparse information he
assembled. That evidentiary failing suggests that the column represented not independentjournalism, but a partnership between
political operatives who were eager to impugn a critic and a compliant journalist who was seeking to sustain a longstanding and
beneficial alliance with sources. Expressed that way, the relation-
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ships would be unlikely to inspire reader trust, and the confidentiality agreement's claim to being ethically aboveboard seems
weak indeed.4 2
It might be objected that all and all, Novak's reporting nevertheless correctly told the public that the Bush administration
was trying to nail a critic. Even without naming his informants,
Novak's column did make it plain for whom the leakers toiled.
To the degree that his reporting then triggered a federal investigation, perhaps the cause of accountability was served and the
public benefited. Maybe so. But I would insist that it is individuals, not institutions, that must be held accountable. Attributing
the attack to "administration sources" does nothing to tell us
what we most need to know: Who did this? How high in the gov43
ernment did the recklessness extend? We must not lose sight
of the fact that the attack directed at Wilson and Plame was
unleashed from behind cover, and the cover was provided by an
honorable journalistic principle whose fundamentals deserve
serious re-examination.

42. 1 have taken liberties with Baler's own formulation of the expressibility test. She writes: "The moral test of such trust relationships which I have
proposed is that they be able to survive awareness by each party to the relationship of what the other relies on in the first to ensure their continued trustworthiness or trustingness." BAIER, supra note 6, at 128. And later, "[Tlrust is
morally decent only if, in addition to whatever else is entrusted, knowledge of
each party's reasons for confident reliance on the other to continue the relationship could in principle also be entrusted .... " Id. Hence, the test is proposed as a way for the parties to a trust relationship to assess its morality. I am
suggesting an extension of that test. For the public's trust in the journalist to
be, as Baier puts it, "morally decent," the undertakings that the reporter makes
must be ethically sturdy enough to withstand disclosure to those who trust him
or her. Suppose the reporter purloins documents, smuggles hidden cameras
into a private home, combs through trash. A test of the acceptability of those
techniques is the willingness of the journalist to reveal them. By the same
token, if a confidential source relationship is based upon the informant's confidence in the reporter's gullibility and the reporter's eagerness to endear himself to high-level political hacks, the relationship would not survive having its
bases revealed to the two participants. Nor, in the extension I am proposing,
would it withstand disclosure to the public for which the entire arrangement is
ostensibly undertaken.
43. In a letter to the Wall Street Journal, Christopher Wolf, attorney for
Joseph Wilson and Valerie Plame, wrote: "A free press has a compelling interest
in exposing the government's deployment of a newspaper columnist to attack
administration critics." Christopher Wolf, A Hollow Defense ofJournalistic Integrity, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at Al 7.

